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Professor Mashaw has constructed two models of rights to account for
recent developments in American administrative law. I propose to make a
few remarks about the "background conditions" of his models in the light
of larger shifts in the relationships of law, citizen, and society that charac-
terize our times. Two particular topics are of interest to me. One concerns
the nature of the activist state that Professor Mashaw associates with his
public law model of rights. The other is the linkage of his public law
model not only with a government that assumes managerial tasks, but also
with a state apparatus characterized by bureaucratic centralization.
To discuss these themes, I need to place Professor Mashaw's models in
a comparative perspective, a perspective that may appear irrelevant to in-
ternal American developments. Perhaps some will resent certain implica-
tions of expanding the usual framework of reference in talking about the
American activist state and the New Deal. But I hope that the scanning of
larger horizons will be of some use at least as a rough orientation for
internal discourse. As a temporary stay against confusion, even an ignis
fatuus may be better than no light at all.
I.
Professor Mashaw's two models of law are associated with two types of
state: His private law model of rights is related to a state that seeks
merely the maintenance of social equilibrium, and his public law model of
rights is related to a state that manages economic and social life. But
while the former type-the reactive state-can be imagined as a theoreti-
cal end-point of a polarity, the same is not true about the latter
model-the activist state. As defined by my colleague, the activist state
occupies a wide range on a continuum leading from extremes of negligible
involvement to extremes of thoroughgoing managerial government. An ac-
tivist state may leave the allocation of resources to the market and inter-
vene only to correct market imperfections; it may be satisfied only with a
few modest welfare programs. Alternatively, an activist government may
replace markets by a command economy and attempt to run the state as a
giant corporation. From the vantage point of pervasive managerial govern-
ment, a state with a market economy and a few welfare programs may be
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closer to the reactive than to the activist pole.
One wonders what kind of activist state my colleague has in mind as
the background for his public law model of rights: a state that has fulfilled
its activist potential or one that is using it sparingly? At first blush, it
would seem that the former has to be the case: Unless extreme forms of
the managerial government are counterposed to the reactive state, a pure
form is juxtaposed to a hybrid or mixture, and an analysis of the sort that
Professor Mashaw engages in is seriously skewed; employing mixtures in
ideal-typical analysis can be like trying to express the finely shaded nu-
ances of cafr au lait or capuccino by referring only to milk but not to
coffee. Perhaps, however, one need not envisage extremes of activist state
in order to develop an activist model of law. Law springing from activist
postures of government may be indifferent to the changing scope of gov-
ernmental agenda: As managerial concerns of the state expand, the para-
digm of law remains unaltered, and only its range of applicability in-
creases. But is this scenario plausible? An answer to this question requires
that we consider some fairly obvious features of law in intensely manage-
rial states and compare them to those that characterize Professor
Mashaw's public law model.
The central image of law in managerial states is that of decrees spelling
out programs and assigning roles. Some of these decrees may accord citi-
zens a share in the common pie and may look like "rights." Citizens,
however, cannot always freely assert or waive these advantages as they do
rights: If state policy so demands, certain advantages may be forced on
citizens even against their will. Suppose a regulation provides that inmates
of an institution should be given an hour a day for walking in fresh air.
This advantage cannot be waived and officials can compel inmates to
spend an hour in the open. If the reference to rights is maintained, rights
such as these easily shade into obligations. A decree may specify the right
to health care, but at the same time obligate all citizens to take care of
their own health, subjecting them to mandatory measures such as inocula-
tions; the duty to go to school becomes the correlate of the right to educa-
tion. Nor is this commingling perceived as disturbing or anomalous. On
the contrary, it may be welcome as a harbinger of a better future in which
individuals will be related to one another in more harmonious ways: As
their level of consciousness rises, they perform their duties as readily as
they exercise their rights. Eventually, as in the concordia of knowledge
and feeling contemplated by Augustine of Hippo, all alternatives for ac-
tion other than those a person should take may become unattractive; right
and duty merge in an indivisible whole.'
1. For a recent account of Augustinian fundatissima fides, see P. BROWN, AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO
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Strictly speaking, then, claims based on decrees of a managerial state
are mere parodies of rights. To underscore the contrast with the entitle-
ments of the reactive state, one would do better to say that activist law
accords conditional privileges, creates roles, or assigns tasks.' This inter-
pretation is consistent with the optimal strategy employed by citizens at-
tempting to benefit from a regulatory scheme: Rather than aggressively
asserting rights stemming from the regulation, they insist only that offi-
cials observe state decrees, using the weight of the latter, as in jujitsu, to
achieve their aims.
Legal relationships between citizens and those in charge of executing
state programs are not "horizontal"; officials may even retain coercive
powers over citizens involved in disputes with them. The idea of treating
state interests, represented by officials, as being on the same plane with
individual and group interests belongs to the ideological climate of "reac-
tive," not activist, government. Nor are legal relationships between citi-
zens and officials bipolar in any meaningful sense: Even the narrowest
affaire h deux can prove to have larger implications in terms of state pol-
icy. All those strategically placed for the promotion of state policy can be
drawn into the network of regulatory legal relationships. Clearly, then,
there is no room for viewing a conflict between officials and citizens as a
conflict between two equal parties.
Nor is there any deeper justification for taking such conflicts before the
courts. To insist on court enforcement is to assume that judges are neutral
conflict-resolvers, indifferent to the implementation of state policy. But
this assumption is alien to a truly managerial state: There is no ground
for neutrality where state programs are at stake. As in a giant corpora-
tion, people are tied together by their efforts to realize state objectives;
everybody, including the judges, is expected to be committed to the execu-
tion of state programs. Vae neutris.3 As there is thus no "sanctity" to
365-75 (1969). The interpenetration of rights and obligations characterizes Soviet legislation in many
areas. See FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND UNION REPUBLICS ON
PUBLIC HEALTH art. 3 (1979) in 2 COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS AND THE CONSTITUENT UNION REPUBLICS 3 (W. Butler ed. 1983). And an argument
reminiscent of the Augustinian concordia is frequently encountered in Soviet legal writing. See TE-
ORIYA GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA 652-53 (N. Aleksandrov 2d ed. 1974); TEORIYA GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA
460-62 (A. Vasil'ev ed. 1977).
2. For a similar view, see Kamenka & Tay, Beyond the French Revolution: Communist Socialism
and the Concept of Law, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 109, 135 (1971); see also 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY 642 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968) ("public rights" may well be mere "reflexes" of
state regulations); Coing, Signification de la Notion de Droit Subjectif, 9 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE
DU DROIT 6, 13-14 (1964) (drawing distinction between "true" rights and "rights-functions").
3. This view is reflected in systems patterned on the Soviet model; judicial independence is not
understood as independence from governmental policies and causes. See LAW ON COURT ORGANISA-
TION OF THE RSFSR art. 3 (1960) in SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 429 (H. Berman ed.
1966). For a standard presentation of Soviet conceptions of judicial independence, see T. DOBROVOL-
SKAIA, PRINTSIPY SOVETSKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA 164 (1971).
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invoking the judicial process, citizens who feel disadvantaged by official
action complain instead to higher-ups or to specialized officials supposed
to be "guardians" of regulations.4 And administrators enforce regulations
directly, rather than by suing citizens in court.
Even this most fragmentary sketch 5 suffices as a contrast to Professor
Mashaw's public model of rights. Unquestionably, the latter reveals a
kinship to the paradigm of managerial law, but it also incorporates many
features and assumptions that belong to the ideology of reactive govern-
ment. Law seems primarily a vehicle for the allocation of rights, even if
these rights are weakened by the requirement that they derive from state
policy. (In other words, law is easily convertible into rights.) Legal rela-
tions continue to be horizontal, even if the subjects of these relationships
may be different from those of the private law model of rights. And there
is a continuing emphasis (albeit diluted) on court enforcement. Finally, if
you reflect for a moment on the vision of society underlying the model, it
is one that presupposes conflict (rich and poor, black and white) rather
than the pursuit of common goals. All this, of course, will come as no
surprise: My colleague conceptualizes against the background of the con-
temporary American state, in which political and legal sensibilities are
still powerfully influenced by notions of reactive government.6 Mixtures
and hybrids thus characterize the legal landscape.
If there is a price to be paid for the resulting impurity of Professor
Mashaw's model, it may be its diminished capacity to account for further
change in the direction of the managerial paradigm of law. In fact, there
may be areas of administrative law in which the ritardando of the public
law model is already in evidence: In the case of toxic waste regulations or
price controls, for example, it may already be more appropriate to talk
4. While a reactive state may teem with lawyers, managerial states bristle with such "guardians"
and supervisors. For an early example of such guardians of regulations, consider the Fiskalat in
absolutist Prussia. E. SCHMIDT, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTSP-
FLEGE 180-81 (3d ed. 1965). The Prussian Fiskalat, the eye and the ear of the ruler, is-in compli-
cated ways-the forefather of the contemporary Soviet Prokurator, "the guardian" (blustitel') of So-
viet "legality."
5. An important feature of activist law not even considered here is its flexibility: Law cannot be
permitted to stand as an obstacle to the realization of state purposes. Rather, it is contingently related
to these purposes and must be modified whenever ineffective or counterproductive. Legal reasoning
"abstracted" from its implications on state policy is a dangerous "fetishism."
6. Until the recent trend toward an increased role of government in all Western capitalist coun-
tries, it was often remarked that government in the English tradition was characterized by the relative
paucity of managerial functions. While continental absolutism tirelessly expanded state concerns, from
army, to education, to welfare, England and America continued to rely to a far greater extent on
various nongovernmental mechanisms for the fulfillment of social needs. The feasibility of such re-
stricted statism perplexed and was variously explained by foreigners. The most fashionable theory
attributes the relative unimportance of the state to the allegedly greater success in Anglo-American
states, especially in America, of capitalist markets and of the "self-regulating" society organized
around them. For speculations on reasons for this greater success, see N. POULANTZAS, POUVOIR
POLITIQUE ET CLASSES SOCIALES DE L'ETAT CAPITALISTE 182-87 (1968).
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about the assignment of "tasks" or "roles" rather than of substantive
rights.
I realize that the development of a purer version of activist law may
appear repugnant because it conjures up the specter of a totalitarian state.
But totalitarianism need not be an inevitable end-result of the expansion
of governmental agenda. And in a historical period in which it is increas-
ingly important to locate intermediate positions between autonomy and
direction, it may be useful (or sobering) to develop conceptual schemes
that reveal the unpleasant extremes not only of reactive government but
also of activist government. Like all good things, an activist government
can be loved too much or unwisely.
II.
Professor Mashaw's public law model is supported not only by a state
that assumes managerial roles, but also by a centralized and bureaucratic
apparatus of authority. Conversely, the private law model is supported
both by a reactive state and a decentralized officialdom. This joinder of
state function and structure as background conditions for the models of
law is justified on two grounds. The first, at least insofar as the American
experience is concerned, is historical: The rise of the American activist
state was accompanied by the rise of federal bureaucracy. The other
ground is analytical: The particular combinations of function and struc-
ture seem to be a good "match." Consider the activist state. Are not utili-
tarian orientations best served by a central decisionmaker? Indeed, state
programs can be implemented more efficiently by professionals marching
to the beat of a single drum than by decentralized amateurs.
I have several reservations about typologies in which aspects of law re-
lated to state functions are merged with those related to the structure of
the apparatus of authority. These reservations stem from the different im-
plications for the legal system of hierarchical bureaucracies and decentral-
ized lay authority. It will not be disputed, I hope, that coordinate lay
authority tolerates greater discretion in decisionmaking than does hierar-
chical bureaucracy, at least in the weak sense of discretion as absence of
superior review. It seems equally obvious that coordinate structures frag-
ment authority and fuse functions, while hierarchical bureaucracies tend
to fuse authority and separate functions. Furthermore, the weight of indi-
vidualized justice-when in conflict with cross-case consistency in deci-
sionmaking-is not equally assessed in the two settings of authority:
While coordinate officials are particularly sensitive to the "equities" of
cases, hierarchically organized bureaucrats place greater emphasis on con-
sistency and regularity of decisionmaking. And the tendency of profession-
als to draw sharp, technical distinctions is alien to amateur generalists.
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With these implications in mind, imagine an activist state ruled by de-
centralized amateur officials-a situation reminiscent of Iran governed by
the mullahs. Through the lens of hierarchical bureaucracy, the legal sys-
tem will be characterized by a great deal of discretionary decisionmaking,
by an emphasis on "justice," and by little differentiation of functions. But
why should these features be attributed to an individualistic or private
paradigm of law, contaminating the "purity" of public law in an activist
state? Coordinate lay authority can exhibit strong collectivistic impulses; it
can be more communal than individualistic.' In fact, its style of decision-
making can thwart the easy assertion of private rights: The limits of free-
dom and autonomy cannot clearly be discerned in the chiaroscuro of offi-
cial discretion. It is therefore clear that authority structures are not
necessarily dependent upon whether the underlying legal model is
predominantly public or private.
But this is only part of the story. If you associate public law with bu-
reaucratic and private law with lay authority, a question arises as to
which type of authority provides the controlling perspective. The distinc-
tion between public and private is not the same in the two institutional
frameworks. While lay authority deals indiscriminately with things pri-
vate and public, it is a hallmark of bureaucracies to "splinter the soul"
and keep the private and public realms strictly apart.8 By making so much
of this dichotomy, Professor Mashaw appears to have tacitly accepted the
bureaucratic viewpoint. And while this "bias" is not fatal to his scheme, it
surely calls for a justification. 9
There is yet another misgiving: To one seeking to express typical pat-
terns of American legal developments in a broader comparative context,
the association of state activism with bureaucratic centralization is quite
regrettable. To an internal vision, or to the eye examining itself, the
7. More generally, my colleague's background conditions for an individualistic or private law
model often evoke the setting of an organic community (Gemeinschaft) more than they do the setting
of an individualistic civil society (Gesellschaft). For example, in Professor Mashaw's scheme the para-
digm of individualistic law is not contract (as one would normally expect) but rather custom. On
T6nnies' distinction betweer Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, see 1 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCI-
ETY 40-43 (G. Roth & C. Wittach eds. 1968).
There are ways of explaining this wavering, but the full argument would take us far beyond the
scope of this Comment. Yet, some glimpses about the reasons for Professor Mashaw's difficulty will
become apparent as we discuss the manner in which he commingles the functions and structure of the
state.
8. On the separation of the office from the incumbent in the formative years of classical continen-
tal bureaucracies, see K. NORR, ZUR STELLUNG DES RICHTERS IM GELEHRTEN PROZESS DER
FROHZEIT 43, 71 (1967). Long before Max Weber, different perceptions of private and public spheres
by bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic officials were a recurrent theme in Hegel's writings. See S.
AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 50-51 (1972).
9. Max Weber was confronted with a similar problem in justifying the primacy of the bureau-
cratic optic. But he recognized the problems and attempted to justify his "rationalist" bias. See A.
KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 52-54 (1983).
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American activist state, of course, is inseparable from bureaucratic cen-
tralization. To an external observer, however, one of the most striking
facets of the American variant of state activism is that the state apparatus,
while increasingly bureaucratized, continues to be permeated by features
attributable to coordinate lay authority. These surviving features are more
pronounced than in any other contemporary industrial state, and they
seem to account for many perplexing characteristics of the political and
legal systems. In support of this robust contention, consider the impres-
sions of foreign visitors exposed to the American variant of state activism.
At a most general level, they wonder about the compatibility of activist
impulses with an apparatus of government with so many overlapping
power centers. These freins et contrepoids seem an example of a mismatch
between state function and state structure likely to produce more animated
standstills than vigorous action.10 This impression is reinforced by the lin-
gering political ethos according to which amateurism in government is
good and state bureaucracies an evil force." Bureaucratization in govern-
ment will be noticed by foreign observers, but is apt to be assessed by
them as comparatively modest. Official positions are frequently temporary
or ad hoc, with careers alternating between private and public employ-
ment. Striking is the relative absence of bureaucratic exclusivity, so that
many functions are readily shared by or even completely transferred to
outside amateurs, or nongovernmental specialists. The reliance on outsid-
ers for the enforcement of state programs, even if it causes redundancies
or haphazard implementation, is "pre-bureaucratic" in light of bureau-
cratic tendencies to monopolize action. Quite surprisingly, to orthodox bu-
reaucratic tastes, functions in American government are often fused and
distinctions blurred. Federal judges, for example, conjoin administrative,
legislative, and judicial functions to a degree likely to drive Montes-
quieuans into despair. 12 Most astonishing, perhaps, is the continuing de-
centralization and the concomitant mild hierarchization of authority: In
lieu of taller governmental structures, one finds a multitude of feuding
small bureaucracies that pursue few common policies. Frequently they are
grafted upon preexisting nonprofessional power centers, locked into adver-
10. Those of structuralist persuasion are likely to talk about a dicalage (or discrepancy) between
state functions and state organization. See N. POULANTZAS, supra note 6, at 166-67.
11. See Huntington, Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many,
89 POL. SC. Q. 1, 20-22 (1974).
12. Private attorneys general combine-in a typical "coordinate" style-both public and private
functions. Discovery devices in civil proceedings are hardly differentiated when it comes to "public
interest" or to private litigation. The criminal process is often interpreted as a "conflict-solving" enter-
prise rather than an instance of criminal policy enforcement. From the continental perspective, Anglo-
American administrative and judicial proceedings are insufficiently distinguished. For a comparative
perspective, see M. TARUFFO, IL PROCESSOR CMLE "ADVERSARY" NELL' ESPERIENZA AMERICANA
207 n.29 (1979). And one could easily go on.
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sary relationships. 3 It would thus seem that old impressions by observers
like de Tocqueville or Marx on the weakness of the state and the "gap"
in the executive have survived changes adopted in the aftermath of the
New Deal. 4
What lesson does this larger perspective teach one who intends to en-
gage in ideal-typical analysis of law? If one is to characterize American
legal developments, features of law attributable to state functions and
those attributable to the modalities of the state apparatus should be kept
apart. The paradigm of activist law, abstracting from features related to
state functions, can then be employed in combination with two different
models of authority structure, abstracting from features related to the
structure of the apparatus of government. Much as the actual functions of
the American state are a mixture of activist and reactive concerns, so the
actual American authority structure is a mixture of bureaucratic and pre-
bureaucratic forms.
But you might object, since Professor Mashaw is not doing comparative
law, his conjoining of state activism and bureaucracy may be justified.
After all, models should account for developing trends. If they are abstrac-
tions from snapshots of the present moment, they cannot account for the
future and may be quickly overtaken by reality. Faced with overpopula-
tion, increasing interdependence, the sheer scale of problems, and many
other consequences of technological advance, will not an activist state inev-
itably develop into a centralized bureaucracy? Arguably, then, it is quite
proper to conjoin state activism and bureaucratization as background con-
ditions for the paradigm of public law.
Be this as it may, I still prefer a conceptual scheme in which the appa-
ratus of the activist state can be studied as a mixture of hierarchical and
coordinate elements. And while the intrusion of coordinate features may
impede the efficiency of the governmental machinery, it can also impede
the movement toward technocratic totalitarianism. Coordinate authority,
as an alternative model to bureaucratic structures, can assist one in better
expressing and perhaps better balancing the tensions between democracy
and bureaucracy, human autonomy and state direction-all tensions that
are likely to intensify in the future. That there is nothing inevitable in the
move toward a technocratic Leviathan is at least the hope of those who
13. A good example is the possibility of adversary clashes between public prosecutors and public
defenders, both paid by the state. Also surprising to continentals is the scheme of legal aid,
which-although funded centrally-is run locally without over-all uniform objectives.
14. It would be more tiresome than instructive to refer to passages from de Tocqueville. It is less
widely known that, concerning nineteenth-century America, Marx wrote that the machinery of gov-
ernment was reduced to the very minimum possible in "bourgeois" society. See 3 AUS DEM LITERARIS-
CHEN NACHLASS VON KARL MARX, FRIEDRICH ENGELS UND FERDINAND LASSALE 438 (F. Mehring
ed. 1902).
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have experienced the marriage of red tape and red rule. It is especially the
hope of this commentator who has lived through the struggle between
"self-managing" and "statist" strands in Yugoslav socialism. But this is
not a story for a night devoted to ideal-typical analysis. For it is hard for
me to speak with Weberian dispassion about loves I have lost.
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